The "Threat" of Chinese Expansion: An Analysis of the PRC's Air Defense Identification Zone

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of National Defense announced, on November 23, 2013, the enforcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), detailing strict aircraft identification rules for zones surrounding the PRC’s eastern seaboard. An ADIZ is a publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace (Welch). An ADIZ is the first and most influential step in the adaptation of stringent defensive strategies in order to avoid the possibility of an unwanted confrontation with surrounding states. The issuance of these warnings by the PRC’s National defense ministry establishes that “defensive emergency measures” would be adopted in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions upon breaching the ADIZ. The reasoning behind such a maneuver is described by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) spokesman as “a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defense right” and that “it is not directed against any specific country or target.”(CSIS Team Asia). Nevertheless, the decision to declare an East China Sea ADIZ is a sign proving Beijing’s continuing and highly-personal claim over disputed islands in the East China Sea. Consequently, this new threat adds even more tension to the Western Pacific region, as China has declared the ADIZ over zones currently existing in the ADIZ’s of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (escalating tensions further over disputed Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu Islands - simultaneously claimed by China, Japan, as well as Taiwan).

The issuance of threats by the PRC are in direct response to recent Japanese warnings stating “[Japan] reserves the right to shoot down unmanned drones that pose a threat to Japanese airspace” (Rapp-Hopper). By drawing an ADIZ that includes the Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu Islands, Beijing believes it has established a basis for challenging and -if necessary- responding with military action against Japanese aircraft operating in the zone. This form of self-protection by China’s government may also have another purpose in seeking the benefits of demonstrating to its domestic audience that the party and military are doing their utmost to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Originating from this necessity of defending China’s integrity, recent spikes in the Chinese economy and massive military advancements have further provoked the PRC to begin establishing itself as a dominating power among the nations immediately surrounding itself. It is pertinent to understand that within the context of the new Chinese leadership’s framing of the security challenges it faces in the region, Beijing’s actions in placing an ADIZ are consistent with a longstanding tradition of seeking to avoid tensions on multiple fronts at any one time (For example: the Mongolian independence in the mid-20th century was solely established as a buffer zone between the USSR and the PRC). Viewed as the friendlier approach towards tensions in the Southeast Asian region, this frame of thought is characterized as a necessary precursor to even tougher policies in approaching Beijing’s cat-and-mouse game with the Japanese government.

Distracted by its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and a teetering economy, the senior Chinese leadership (2012) largely deferred an authoritative review of the implications regarding U.S. strategic “rebalancing” in Asia for China’s security. With the succession now complete, however, the outlines of Xi Jin Ping’s assessment of the situation are coming into sharper focus. Recent authoritative Chinese documents have reaffirmed the validity of China’s primary external strategic guidelines judgment in which China has a “period of strategic opportunity” extending through 2020 - allowing it to focus on internal development. Consequently, against that backdrop, Xi’s frequent admonitions to the PLA to be prepared to “fight and win wars” take on an added significance. Along with hints that the leadership is considering sweeping military structural reforms aimed at improving the PLA’s combat effectiveness, it leaves an impression that the leadership is signaling that it judges the risk of conflict in the region to be on the rise. The establishment of the ADIZ can therefore be seen as contributing to the seeming sense of urgency that Xi is seeking to foster in shaping the regime’s response to this threat assessment. It also suggests that, while still the predominant concern, the possibility of an accident in the disputed Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu territory is not the only risk of escalation in the East China Sea that international security planners should be focusing on.

Tensions in the East China Sea are undoubtedly high, considering the dangers a of surprise attack escalating when at least one party in a conflict considers war inevitable and thinks that getting in the first blow would deliver a decisive military advantage. To the extent that China’s ADIZ has deepened regional fears about China’s long-term intentions, it has actually increased this risk. It is evident that China’s ADIZ has no prospect of increasing transparency, predictability, or strategic stability. It has prompted confusion among commercial airlines and ostentatious demonstrations of noncompliance by the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean militaries. Since China’s ADIZ overlaps with Japan’s, there is now a very real possibility that a plane in the area could receive conflicting instructions and face simultaneous Chinese and Japanese interception. China declared an ADIZ in the belief that it would aid in its dispute with Japan over the Diao Yu Islands in that an ADIZ signals or confers sovereign rights; as well as, they believe that declaring an ADIZ covering the disputed islands would enhance their bargaining position. 

ADIZ’s can increase transparency, predictability, and strategic stability by reducing uncertainty on both sides about when, where, and how aerial interceptions might take place. There are no international agreements governing any aspect of an ADIZ, however states are neither explicitly authorized to establish them nor are they explicitly prohibited from doing so. ADIZs usually extend into what is universally acknowledged to be international airspace, even by the countries that maintain them, and in no way confer any sovereign rights. Since states have the right to regulate air traffic only over their sovereign territory, countries are not legally obliged to comply with another countries’ ADIZ requirements in international airspace, but tend to do so because of the added security and safety benefits to all. Conclusively, an air defense identification zone is about security and safety, not politics or law.

Resources:

(FA) - Welch, David A. "What's an ADIZ?" Global. Foreign Affairs, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140367/david-a-welch/whats-an-adiz

(TD) - Rapp-Hopper, Mira. "East China Sea ADIZ: A Turning Point in US-China Relations?" The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 20 Dec. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/east-china-sea-adiz-a-turning-point-in-    us-china-relations/

(CSIS) - CSIS Team, Asia. "China's Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional Security." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 29 Nov. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http://   csis.org/publication/chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-impact-regional-security

History and Culture (CAPS #2)

The history of a culture is an important factor in shaping one's identity.  Preservation of cultural identity, based upon difference, is a divisive force in society giving individuals a greater sense of shared citizenship (Hall). When considering practical association in the international society, nations may share an inherent part of their "make up", which creates an alternative means of identifying with each other. Nations provide framework for cultural identities called external cultural reality, which influence the unique internal cultural realities of the individuals within the nation. Cultural identifiers may be the result of various conditions including:  location,  gender,  race,  history,  nationality,  language,  sexuality,  religion,  ethnicity,  and even food (Gunter Schubert).  The divisions between cultures can be very fine in some parts of the world, especially in the case of China, where the population is ethnically diverse and [for the most part] socially united - based primarily on common social values and beliefs. A range of cultural complexities structure the way individuals operate with the cultural realities in their lives. Cultural identities are influenced by several different factors such as ones religion, ancestry, skin colour, language, class, education, profession, skill, family and political attitudes. One's nation is a large factor of the cultural complexity, as it constructs the foundation for individual’s identity, however may contrast with ones cultural reality (Holliday). 

In the beginning, Chinese self-perception was not so much an ethnic one – now belonging to the Han race―as a cultural one, belonging to the Chinese culture circle: an early Chinese culturalism. Chinese culture was so attractive that it led to a long-lasting predominance over surrounding nations and tribes. This predominance, and the feeling of being superior to other nations, was an additional aspect of the identity that had developed over the centuries. The unfolding of the identity crisis in China followed continuous defeats by Western powers in the nineteenth century. Further on, during the period of Maoist “patriotism”, communist historiography did not regard classic Chinese culture as an important element of Chinese identity. On the contrary, the nation was based on classes (class nation): the peasantry, the proletariat, and the petty national bourgeoisie. In the 1980s, after the so-called "Cultural Revolution", when large parts of China’s cultural heritage were destroyed, the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to culture slowly changed. Step by step, the Party began to reinstate Chinese culture as an element of Chinese nationalism, together with ethnic aspects and Confucian ideology. There have been multiple, continuous attempts of China’s intellectual elite to develop a new cultural and national identity after the decline of Chinese Marxism-Leninism. Modern identity-building and the perception of the West by discussing the rising importance of Confucianism, the role of history and language, and the renaissance of Western thought have begun to shift Chinese nationalism more or less as a response to Western imperialism.

Despite attempts to create a national identity through reviving Chinese tradition, and even racial thinking, one cannot simply speak of one Chinese national identity or one Chinese nationalism. Instead, one can observe the fragmentation of Chinese identity - even among the Han majority - and the emergence of various regional identities and national movements in China. The Communist Party is struggling to keep all of these, sometimes centrifugal, forces under control by utilizing traditional cultural, ethnic, and racial elements under the blanket of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics".

References:

Cf. Gunter Schubert (2002), Chinas Kampf um die Nation. Hamburg, 116ff, 133ff.

Hall, S., & Du Gay, P. (1996). Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage. ISBN 0-8039-7883-9

Holliday, A. (2010). Complexity in cultural identity. Language and Intercultural Communication, 10(2), 165-177. doi: 10.1080/14708470903267384

Cultural Identity (CAPS #1)

Identity has become a pertinent piece of framework for the individual and for groups and nations in their search for safe ground in disturbed times. The term is defined in its most general form by Erik Erikson, as the term “...expresses … a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others.”[Erickson]. Thus, individual identities can only be established within group identities. Each person has multiple collective identities, which can be defined through gender, kinship, space or territory (local and regional identity), class, education, occupation, institution, religion, ethnicity, race, culture and, finally, nationality and supra-nationality [Smith]. National and individual identities are indefinitely not static, but are continuously changing. Each individual, group, and nation perpetually try to redefine his/her/its identity when it is endangered, challenged, or even broken. This is understood as an "identity crisis", influencing those affected to search for and formulate a redefinition of a new identity. This process of adaptation, in which a new equilibrium is sought between traditional elements and new challenges, continues until the "crisis" is solved  when a successful remolding of a new equilibrium, however temporary, is achieved.

For a quick example of this paradigm in the human psyche, I would love to mention a few cultural patterns found in China. Generalizations in history are always dangerous and, consequently, the deeper one looks into a singular case in history, the more differences will be found. Although Chinese intellectuals have differed on how to respond to the Western challenges, more or less all who have dealt with Chinese history in one way or another agree on certain aspects, which are regarded as parts of Chinese cultural and national identity (most likely with the exception of the early Marxists tendencies):

• A long history dating as far back as 5 thousand years;

• The identity of the Han people as the descendents of the Yellow Emperor;

• Continuity of the idea of a Chinese Empire through all dynastic changes and foreign rule;

• Uniqueness of the Chinese language;

• Traditions of religion and philosophy;

• Literature, poetry, painting, ceramics, music, etc.;

• Inventions in areas such as medicine, weaponry, shipbuilding, porcelain, etc. (which in many cases were unsurpassed until the Renaissance); 

• And, despite many regional varieties, a common everyday culture.

Rising nationalist rhetoric and continuous attempts to form a collective Chinese identity among all of the different people and cultures has become a threat to their individual ethnic and cultural identities. Official policies force the minorities to rediscover and redefine their own identities, to which arouses national feeling among them. Furthermore, a possible solution to the clash between conflicting cultural and national identities in China could lie in the development of a multi-ethnic nationalism based on the principles of political liberalism paired with the Chinese interpretation understanding of Western philosophy. This, as I have come to understand, could lead to a common Chinese understanding, to which basic modes of thinking can be found in both cultures, and that these can be used to establish the foundations for a better Chinese intellectual discourse in the future.

References:

Erikson, Erik H. (1959) Identity and the Life Cycle. New York, Norton, pp. 27-28.

Smith, Anthony D. (1991) National Identity. Reno, University of Nevada Press, 3ff; Dean, Kathryn

Justin Hatfield Introduction

Hey everyone, I'm Justin. I am 19 years old, living off-campus now in downtown Lincoln. My life has definitely been an interesting one, as I was born on US soil, however moved around quite a bit for my fathers' career in the military. Growing up in Hawaii and Virginia for a short period of time, my sister and I discovered most of our writing and reading skills, and social etiquette where learned while growing up and attending school with other children (from around the world - also in similar situations for the most part) in Australia’s capital - Canberra. 

After returning to the states, I have come to identify myself mainly with that of my Native culture. I tend to stray away from considering myself white, emphasizing my biological father’s family Lebanese ancestry. Furthermore, I have been more exposed to Native traditions upon returning to US and I was blessed to have the honour of graduating a Native honour student (participated in a graduation ceremony held by the Omaha tribe). Alongside discovering my heritage and traditions upon returning from Australia, I came to experience and be a art of a whole new lifestyle and aspect of human nature. My mother became increasingly involved in music and took a partner, Karen, after discovering her true self. My sister and I both have been taken care of and raised by these two strong, and highly intelligent women for the past 6 years. 

After having a few disappointing experiences with the [mainstream] Christian religion, I found myself claiming no religion of my own. Interested in all religions and ways of life, I have adopted many different views and values from each religion I have come in to contact with. Religion and language are key in interacting with other on a mutual level level of understanding. I have much to learn, but I take pride in the experiences that have kept my mind open to all walks of life.

As a result of my experiences and education abroad, I have conclusively decided on working to become a foreign affairs officer for the US government. In having the experiences throughout my life, I feel it is pertinent to use my abilities to better relations between the US and China. I feel I have the capability to make the changes necessary in government to better life for the people it governs. Widespread corruption and arrogant politicians dirty the US and Chinese governments, and I feel those who are willing and experienced can make changes for the better of both of our societies.

Life before Nebraska was extremely productive, in the sense that I learned so much from my surroundings and of other people and cultures. It is a part of my life to want to explore and want to go see new places and meet new people. I feel very passionate about that aspect of who I am as an individual and live to understand others and the reasons behind who they are and the what/why about their viewpoints to create a better relationship - learning more and more from each person I meet (i.e. this class is extremely useful in contextualizing and further examining different cultures and people around us).

I feel I am truly an un-American [Native] American. I do follow The Great Spirit - as my ancestors did generations ago - and I have and always will be open to all cultures, religions, and languages. I do feel that my life has been an interesting one at that, and believe I have a responsibility to use my abilities for the benefit of those around me to create a better, more worldly society - as complex and beautiful as it is. I believe we should work towards furthering cultural understanding worldwide and preserve our rights as human beings (human rights, etc.). I am not cocky or self absorbed, however am determined to find that path towards continuing the push to further “racial” understanding, and establish the fact we are all made as equals.

I am not pure or perfect, but that’s me and a little sliver of my cultural identity. 

Thanks!

Justin Hatfield