The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of National Defense announced, on November 23, 2013, the enforcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), detailing strict aircraft identification rules for zones surrounding the PRC’s eastern seaboard. An ADIZ is a publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace (Welch). An ADIZ is the first and most influential step in the adaptation of stringent defensive strategies in order to avoid the possibility of an unwanted confrontation with surrounding states. The issuance of these warnings by the PRC’s National defense ministry establishes that “defensive emergency measures” would be adopted in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions upon breaching the ADIZ. The reasoning behind such a maneuver is described by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) spokesman as “a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defense right” and that “it is not directed against any specific country or target.”(CSIS Team Asia). Nevertheless, the decision to declare an East China Sea ADIZ is a sign proving Beijing’s continuing and highly-personal claim over disputed islands in the East China Sea. Consequently, this new threat adds even more tension to the Western Pacific region, as China has declared the ADIZ over zones currently existing in the ADIZ’s of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (escalating tensions further over disputed Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu Islands - simultaneously claimed by China, Japan, as well as Taiwan).
The issuance of threats by the PRC are in direct response to recent Japanese warnings stating “[Japan] reserves the right to shoot down unmanned drones that pose a threat to Japanese airspace” (Rapp-Hopper). By drawing an ADIZ that includes the Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu Islands, Beijing believes it has established a basis for challenging and -if necessary- responding with military action against Japanese aircraft operating in the zone. This form of self-protection by China’s government may also have another purpose in seeking the benefits of demonstrating to its domestic audience that the party and military are doing their utmost to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Originating from this necessity of defending China’s integrity, recent spikes in the Chinese economy and massive military advancements have further provoked the PRC to begin establishing itself as a dominating power among the nations immediately surrounding itself. It is pertinent to understand that within the context of the new Chinese leadership’s framing of the security challenges it faces in the region, Beijing’s actions in placing an ADIZ are consistent with a longstanding tradition of seeking to avoid tensions on multiple fronts at any one time (For example: the Mongolian independence in the mid-20th century was solely established as a buffer zone between the USSR and the PRC). Viewed as the friendlier approach towards tensions in the Southeast Asian region, this frame of thought is characterized as a necessary precursor to even tougher policies in approaching Beijing’s cat-and-mouse game with the Japanese government.
Distracted by its once-in-a-decade leadership transition and a teetering economy, the senior Chinese leadership (2012) largely deferred an authoritative review of the implications regarding U.S. strategic “rebalancing” in Asia for China’s security. With the succession now complete, however, the outlines of Xi Jin Ping’s assessment of the situation are coming into sharper focus. Recent authoritative Chinese documents have reaffirmed the validity of China’s primary external strategic guidelines judgment in which China has a “period of strategic opportunity” extending through 2020 - allowing it to focus on internal development. Consequently, against that backdrop, Xi’s frequent admonitions to the PLA to be prepared to “fight and win wars” take on an added significance. Along with hints that the leadership is considering sweeping military structural reforms aimed at improving the PLA’s combat effectiveness, it leaves an impression that the leadership is signaling that it judges the risk of conflict in the region to be on the rise. The establishment of the ADIZ can therefore be seen as contributing to the seeming sense of urgency that Xi is seeking to foster in shaping the regime’s response to this threat assessment. It also suggests that, while still the predominant concern, the possibility of an accident in the disputed Sen Ka Ku/Diao Yu territory is not the only risk of escalation in the East China Sea that international security planners should be focusing on.
Tensions in the East China Sea are undoubtedly high, considering the dangers a of surprise attack escalating when at least one party in a conflict considers war inevitable and thinks that getting in the first blow would deliver a decisive military advantage. To the extent that China’s ADIZ has deepened regional fears about China’s long-term intentions, it has actually increased this risk. It is evident that China’s ADIZ has no prospect of increasing transparency, predictability, or strategic stability. It has prompted confusion among commercial airlines and ostentatious demonstrations of noncompliance by the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean militaries. Since China’s ADIZ overlaps with Japan’s, there is now a very real possibility that a plane in the area could receive conflicting instructions and face simultaneous Chinese and Japanese interception. China declared an ADIZ in the belief that it would aid in its dispute with Japan over the Diao Yu Islands in that an ADIZ signals or confers sovereign rights; as well as, they believe that declaring an ADIZ covering the disputed islands would enhance their bargaining position.
ADIZ’s can increase transparency, predictability, and strategic stability by reducing uncertainty on both sides about when, where, and how aerial interceptions might take place. There are no international agreements governing any aspect of an ADIZ, however states are neither explicitly authorized to establish them nor are they explicitly prohibited from doing so. ADIZs usually extend into what is universally acknowledged to be international airspace, even by the countries that maintain them, and in no way confer any sovereign rights. Since states have the right to regulate air traffic only over their sovereign territory, countries are not legally obliged to comply with another countries’ ADIZ requirements in international airspace, but tend to do so because of the added security and safety benefits to all. Conclusively, an air defense identification zone is about security and safety, not politics or law.
Resources:
(FA) - Welch, David A. "What's an ADIZ?" Global. Foreign Affairs, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140367/david-a-welch/whats-an-adiz
(TD) - Rapp-Hopper, Mira. "East China Sea ADIZ: A Turning Point in US-China Relations?" The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 20 Dec. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/east-china-sea-adiz-a-turning-point-in- us-china-relations/
(CSIS) - CSIS Team, Asia. "China's Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional Security." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 29 Nov. 2013. Web. 05 Feb. 2014. http:// csis.org/publication/chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-impact-regional-security
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